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Introduction
Over the last 50 years, insured losses caused by natural disasters have followed an increasing trend.
1 Population increase and economic growth on the one hand, the development of insurance markets on the other hand, have expanded the global insurance industry. In the future, continued growth and development in at-risk zones and possible changes in climate are likely to maintain or amplify this trend. This evolution would represent a signicant challenge for the insurance industry (Herweijer et al., 2009) . Reinsurance rms are particularly exposed to these issues as they supply disaster coverage to insurance companies for hurricanes, windstorms or earthquakes, among others.
The reinsurance market resilience is a concern for the insurance sector. In particular, insurers need to assess the ability of the reinsurance sector to absorb large shocks. More specically, they need to know how important losses impact the reinsurance market capacity, reinsurance prices and the time needed for the sector to recover.
2 From a public policy perspective, one may ask if a modied solvency regulation increases the system resilience, and how it impacts the market.
Resilience is a key issue in the nance industry in general. It has been raised again following the nancial crisis, as the ability of the nancial markets to withstand shocks has been questioned. The economic literature has examined the question of regulations for nancial industries and especially insurance industry (see Plantin and Rochet (2007) for a review). Our study focuses on the specic case of the robustness of the reinsurance market to large shocks but its conclusions are of interest for the nancial sector in general.
In this paper, we analyze the impact of important catastrophic losses on the reinsurance market, using a dynamic model of the reinsurance sector based on a solvency constraint for reinsurance rms. We thus enrich Winter (1994) rst dynamic model of the competitive insurance market. This solvency constraint is represented by a bounded probability of default, and the model is related to the classical capacity constraint hypothesis. Furthermore, we take into account the strategic eects of rms individual behavior on the market equilibrium, completing the traditional competitive view of the insurance industry (Hardelin and Lemoyne de Forges, 2009 ).
Model results show a market dynamics that reproduces many real-world observations, suggesting that the capacity-constraint hypothesis is able to explain the observed variability in reinsurance prices and quantities, provided that strategic behavior is taken into account. We nd path-dependency, i.e. the fact that the consequence of a one shock depends on previous years losses and reinsurers response. We characterize and quantify the resilience of the sector through the time necessary to restore reinsurance capacity after large disasters. We provide a sensitivity analysis of the key parameters including higher loss levels and series of losses. We show that improving the ability of the reinsurance market to cope with large losses and reducing reinsurer default probability that is consolidating reinsurance rms with regard to risk has a cost, due to its negative impact on market prices and capacity. Thus we exhibit a regulation trade-o between market resilience and eciency.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briey describes the main characteristics of the reinsurance market for natural catastrophe risks. Section 3 presents the underlying economic 1 See
Munich
Re's long-term statistics:
http://www.munichre.com/en/ts/geo\_risks/ natcatservice/long-term\_statistics\_since\_1950/default.aspx model and its main assumptions and limits. Section 4 describes the modeling approach and details the data used for the calibration. Section 5 proposes a reference scenario and compares it with the stylized facts described in the literature. Section 6 provides a sensitivity analysis on model parameters. Section 7 discusses the regulation trade-o beween eciency and resilience. Section 8 concludes.
2 The reinsurance market for natural catastrophes -An overview
The reinsurance market is a relatively small market compared to the insurance industry. Its capitalization, all lines included, was estimated at the end of 2008 at $309 bn (Aon-Beneld, 2009). As underlined by Plantin (2006) , the demand for reinsurance can be explained from two dierent points of view. Reinsurance can be used by insurance companies as a risk management tool (Borch, 1962; Blazenko, 1986; Lewis and Murdock, 1996; Froot, 2001; Froot and O'Connell, 2008) or from a capital structure perspective (Doherty and Tinic, 1981; Mayers and Smith, 1990; Garven and Tennant, 2003) . In the specic case of natural disasters insurance, the role of reinsurance is actually threefold: (i) reinsurers provide insurance companies with additional capacity, thereby making it possible for them to increase insurance supply; (ii) reinsurance allows for a worldwide mutualization of losses, thus reducing the cost of risks; and (iii) reinsurers provide an expertise on the risks supported by insurers. This third aspect is particularly important for insurance companies of medium and small sizes, which do not always have access to sucient knowledge on disasters risks.
The reinsurance market for natural catastrophe risks is a peculiar market as described in Froot (2001) and Cummins and Trainar (2009) . Contracts, referred to as treaties, are passed between a ceding insurer, called the cedant, and the reinsurance company. They determine the covered portfolio, the underlying risk and the level of coverage. For natural catastrophes coverage, the most common contracts are excess-of-loss treaties based on non-proportional reinsurance.
3 The cedants transfer a layer of the risk from a dened portfolio to the reinsurer at a contractually dened price. A layer is dened by a deductible (the risk remaining at the charge of the insurance companies) and a limit (that is the maximum indemnity that can be paid by the reinsurance companies). For example, an insurer gets coverage for a property portfolio exposed to hurricanes with a treaty of $20 million in excess of $5 million. In this case, if an event (dened in the contract) occurs causing a loss of $12 million, $7 million will be paid by the reinsurer. If an event causes losses amounting to more than $25 million, the reinsurer only pays $20 million to the cedant. Typically, a cedant builds a reinsurance program, dividing coverage among dierent reinsurers even for the same layer of the risk, thus diversifying its exposure to each reinsurer, and taking into account its quality (for instance its default risk, its claims management system, etc.). Note that there is no standardized market for such risks, and data on these contracts are dicult to obtain.
To model the ability of the reinsurance industry to withstand large disasters, a good understanding of its specicities is necessary. Numerous contributions see a limited systemic risk from disasters in the sector, as mentioned by the reports of The Group of Thirty (2005) and The Geneva Association Systemic Risk Working Group (2010) . But even if capital depletion in the reinsurance industry does not increase the risk of default signicantly, it has however an important impact 3 Other types of reinsurance contracts are described in Cummins and Trainar (2009). on reinsurance prices (Guy Carpenter, 2009 ) and thus on the capacity of insurance companies to maintain the same level of coverage. As a consequence, it impacts signicantly insurance prices and the wider economy.
Several market characteristics have to be taken into account to understand better this mechanism which is complicated by the entangled aspect of the reinsurance market and its opacity. First, the market has a small number of participants who share a lot of business risks (exposition to large disasters, asset risks). Second, the reinsurers may themselves use retrocession, i.e. they transfer part of their risk to other companies.
4 Third, the reinsurance market is characterized by several market imperfections that explain the limited use of reinsurance. Indeed, the market volume of the global reinsurance market is quite low compared to the insurance one, and the price of reinsurance has been found quite high, up to several times the actuarial price (the expected loss of the underlying risk's distribution). Market imperfections, as listed by Froot (2001) , include important frictional costs linked to the illiquidity of reinsurance treaties; moral hazard (Bohn and Hall, 1999; Doherty and Smetters, 2005) ; adverse selection (Cutler and Zeckhauser, 1999; Jean-Baptiste and Santomero, 2000) ; interventions on the reinsurance market by third-parties, from disaster reliefs of all forms to state guaranty funds (Bohn and Hall, 1999) ; and agency issues. However, K. Froot underlines two aspects of the market that are particularly important: (i) capital market imperfections that lead to capacity shortage; and (ii) reinsurance market power. Our modeling exercise is built on these two mechanisms.
Another characteristic of the industry is the time-variability of prices and capacities, which is often referred to as a cycle (Meier, 2006) . A large literature exists on the reinsurance cycle, on which a review has been conducted by Weiss (2007) . It provides a wider theoretical analysis of the dynamics of insurance and reinsurance markets. Thus, reinsurance prices are high during hard market and low during soft markets. Even if this denomination of cycle is debated (Kessler, 2005) , the special role of disasters is noted as they may induce an important depletion of capacity (Weiss, 2007) . This hypothesis is reinforced by the observation of emerging transitory means for reinsurance companies to gain access to additional capital after large shocks, like catastrophe bonds or newer vehicles (Lane, 2007a; Cummins, 2008) , or the emergence of new reinsurance companies as the Bermudians (Lane, 2007b). 5 Figure 1 represents the evolution of natural catastrophe reinsurance price index (given by the rate-on-line) as well as new capital ows into the natural catastrophe reinsurance industry. 6 The rate-on-line corresponds to the reinsurance limit (that is the maximum indemnity that can be paid by the reinsurance company) of a contract divided by the premium paid. It is an imperfect proxy for reinsurance prices, but it is widely used in the industry. on the impact of capacity constraints on market prices (Gron, 1994) . As Weiss and Chung (2004) mentions, these models are particularly relevant for the study of extreme events impact on the reinsurance market. The second kind is based on a risky debt hypothesis in which customers are concerned about the liability of their insurance companies (Cummins and Danzon, 1997; Zanjani, 2002) .
Our model builds on these analyzes to address the issue of natural catastrophe reinsurance capacity but proposes a dierent approach and four main contributions. First, the model is dynamic and can be used to estimate market resiliency to series of disasters. Existing companies resistance to catastrophe losses is modeled. The time needed for the market to replenish itself is simulated.
Secondly, it allows for a better understanding of the impact of market imperfections on the reinsurance supply. It takes into account the small size of the reinsurance market and particularly the leading role of the few reinsurers with large market shares. The consequences of nancial market imperfections are also scrutinized. Third, the validation of the model behavior compared to what is currently observed allows for a discussion on the ability of the sector to adapt to increasing exposure and losses, due to socio-economic drivers and climate change. Four, the model makes it possible to investigate the costs and benets of regulation that aims at reducing reinsurers default risk and increasing systemic resilience. We suppose that market demand is characterized by d(p), the share of the insured underlying risk covered by the reinsurance market, in other words the fraction of the insured losses that are transferred to reinsurers. This coinsurance factor only depends on the market reinsurance price p:
For notational simplicity, the subscript t, which refers to time, is omitted in all equations. The parameter δ characterizes the elasticity of demand to market price. is decreasing and convex in p.
Reinsurance supply
We consider a market with N R reinsurance rms, indexed by r = 1, .., N R , that produce equivalent goods O r . The variable O r is the amount of reinsurance coverage (in terms of coinsurance factor) that is supplied to a unique global insurance market, i.e. to a continuum of insurance companies. For example, in presence of insured lossesL, reinsurer r will have to pay O rL to its customer insurers when losses are distributed homogeneously among reinsurers (see Section 3.4 for details).
At the beginning of the period, each reinsurer has an initial wealth W r that arises from the capital issued in the past and accumulated surplus. This capital is costly to hold, even if it corresponds to the accumulation of retained earnings.
At each period, the reinsurance company chooses O r . The reinsurer can also acquire some external capital E r ≥ 0, if this additional wealth allows it to supply more coverage and to increase the premiums it receives in such a way that it increases its prots in spite of higher capital costs.
This new external capital is costly to raise on short notice (Froot and Stein, 1998) . Also, the reinsurer can reduce its wealth by E r < 0, through purchases of its own shares to shareholders. This is the case if the cost of capital is larger than benets that can be derived from it in the reinsurance business.
Our model relies on a strong assumption of perfect information. Each reinsurer knows the loss distribution perfectly. Then, when it decides the risk amount it covers, the external capital acquisition and given an initial wealth, it is able to compute a nal wealth for all possible losses and quantify its bankruptcy risk.
The probability of default π D of a given reinsurer is a key variable in our dynamic model. In a nutshell, it represents the quantied risk that this reinsurer goes bankrupt, i.e. the risk that the realized loss at this year added to all costs outweighs the sum of the capital and earned premiums.
We then make the following assumption: (A1) Reinsurers limit their default probability under an exogenous below a limit π lim that corresponds to an exogenous solvency constraint, linked to regulatory requirements.
Reinsurer's program
We model the reinsurance companies from a managerial perspective (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) .
We assume, therefore, that all reinsurers aim at maximizing the rm total prots rather than maximizing the return on equity. Prots depend on the quantity of risk subscribed by the rm and its price, the level of capital raised or bought back, and the initial wealth of the rm. Raising additional capital allows for a decrease of the reinsurer default risk, and thus larger reinsurance supply. The following equation denes expected prots for one period of time (subscript t is omitted).
where pO r is the reinsurer revenue from premium, and EL r is the expected loss reinsured by reinsurer r (see Section 3.4 for details). Earned premium and capital (new external and initial wealth) are invested at the risk-free rate α. Furthermore, there is a dead weight cost of raising additional capital (E r > 0):
We assume that there is no cost for reducing the amount of capital through share purchase programs and special dividend. The term S r (E r + W r ) corresponds to the cost of carrying capital, where S r is the remuneration of capital asked by reinsurer shareholders. The dierence (S r − α) is the corresponding risk premium. The model does not distinguish between the long-term cost of internal and external capital.
A complete treatment of the reinsurers program at time t would involve the denition of an expected actualized value function integrating the expected actualized prots in following periods.
7
Here, we propose a simple approach where at each period t, the reinsurance companies maximize their expected prots over one year, taking into account their solvency constraints. Moreover, a limit is introduced on share repurchase and special dividend distribution.
7 Indeed, the program could be written in a form recalling Bellman's equations. The problem could then be broken apart following Bellman's principle of optimality, as the choice for (O t r , E t r ) at period t can be separated from all choices for further periods. Such a dynamic model is very dicult to solve due to the recursive term of the equation. Most of the time, it is resolved through linearization or at the stationary mode. However, our situation can not be satised with such practices as (1) the equations of the valuation of the rm are quite complicated and cannot be easily linearized, and (2) our interest resides in the analysis of the non stationary (non linear) dynamics after great shocks that can deplete the rms from a large share of their wealth.
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Indeed, two situations can be encountered at time t:
• The reinsurance company is under-capitalized and thus is in a situation where the solvency constraint is saturated. In such case, we consider that short term considerations overcome the inter-temporal issues, and the optimization is done over one year only.
• The reinsurance company is overcapitalized at the beginning of the period and thus its quantity choice is not restrained by the solvency constraint. If the reinsurance company only considered short-term eects at the beginning of period t, it would redistribute to shareholders as much capital as it could, until the solvency constraint is saturated. However, the intertemporal part of the program gives an incentive to limit the redistribution to shareholders, taking into account the value of keeping more wealth in case of losses in the years to come or of better business opportunities in case prices increase. To represent these inter-temporal eects in a simple way, we assume that the quantity of capital that the rm can redistribute over a year is limited.
This simplication leads to the following assumption: (A2) Reducing the amount of capital through share purchase and special dividend is restricted to a share κ of the reinsurer's wealth at the beginning of the period.
From Assumptions (A1) and (A2), we consider that managers choose the quantity O r they supply to the market and their level of external capital E r , in order to maximize their expected prot under their solvency constraint and the limit on the amount of capital they can redistribute:
EΠ r (O r , E r ) is the expected prot of the rm detailed in Eq.(2).
Market equilibrium
At each period, we consider that reinsurance companies, under perfect information, maximize their expected actualized prot by choosing their reinsurance supply and their capital level, either by raising new capital or buying capital back. We look for a Nash equilibrium where no reinsurer has an interest to deviate from its choice of quantity and capital. We suppose here that (A3): reinsurers compete in quantity. The equilibrium price is such that market demand equals reinsurance supply.
The demand is given by the inverse demand function d(p), where, at equilibrium, the aggregate output of the industry is d(p) = R r=1 O r (p). By denition, as O r correspond to the share of the market risk layer covered by the reinsurance companies, we have d(p) ≤ 1. The equilibrium price is such that market demand equals reinsurance supply.
The equilibrium is dened by the following system at each period (subscript t omitted):
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We solve this system by computing the rst order conditions. Details of the methods can be found in the Appendix.
3.4
Model dynamics 
At time step t + 1, reinsurers' initial wealth depends on the wealth they inherited from the preceding period t, and the loss L t they incurred at the end of time step t. 
where L t r is the amount of losses reinsured by the reinsurer r. We proceed in the following manner: when losses are drawn at the end of each period, they are distributed randomly among reinsurers. Each of them supports a loss:
where˜ is drawn in a normal distribution N (0, 0.5). When computing their default probability and choosing their capital and quantities, reinsurers anticipate this random distribution of losses. We dene a bankruptcy event when a reinsurer wealth goes below a lower limit threshold wealth at the end of the period. This is anticipated in the estimation of reinsurers' probability of default. 
Algorithm
For the resolution of the market equilibrium each year, we decided to use the trust-regionreective algorithm. This algorithm is a subspace trust-region method and is based on the interiorreective Newton method described in Coleman and Li (1994) and Coleman and Li (1996) . Each Probability of default of the rm at time t iteration involves the approximate solution of a large linear system using the method of Preconditioned Conjugate Gradients (PCG).
Scenario
Reinsurance loss coverage
To build the insurance market demand for reinsurance, we proceed in the following manner.
We use model-based aggregate insured loss data from Risk Management Solutions Inc. for the four main reinsurance disaster markets: Japan Earthquake, European Windstorm, US Hurricane and US Earthquake, including four types of risk covered (agricultural, commercial, residential and business). We suppose that there are no correlations between losses in these markets.
For each line l = 1..4, we consider the industry-wide demand for coverage. We noteL l I the loss to which the insurance industry is exposed. Let us considerL l the demand for reinsured loss in the 
This could be interpreted as if there was one layer of the risk that could be covered for each line of risk. In practice, each reinsurer would dene its own layers (limits and retentions) for each risks. This allows the generation of a cumulative distribution function of potential reinsured losses for the whole disaster market. In this version of the model, we assume that T l L = 10 years and T l E = 300 years. We obtain the potential market for reinsured losses by looking at the aggregate potentially reinsured loss distribution. We t this distribution with a log-normal distribution. This model of reinsurance demand is quite limited as reinsurance companies do not all have an equal exposition to catastrophic risks (e.g. earthquake, wind etc...). However, we account here for the main problem reinsurers have to address that is the covariance of the risks and the systematic component of catastrophe risk. One limitation of our model is that we do not take into account diversication aspects as only one line of risk is considered.
Reference simulation: The oligopoly eect
The reference simulation is a starting point to understand the main eects reproduced by the model as well as its limitations. It is based on an ctive market in which all reinsurers are identical. We consider a 50-year simulation with a scenario of annual market losses, assuming that the form of reinsurance demand does not evolve over time (it only depends on the price).
Each year, losses are randomly drawn from the distribution described above. For the purpose of illustration, we introduced a 100-year loss at year 30 and use the same loss scenario for the whole paper. No stochastic distribution of losses among reinsurers is carried out in this rst simulation, and reinsurers incur losses proportional to their market shares (i.e.
= 0 in Equation 8).
The aim is here to understand the dynamics of the present market and check that the model is able to reproduce a realistic dynamics. For these simulations, a bankruptcy event is dened when reinsurer wealth falls below 0. Table 2 presents the values of the parameters used in this reference case. There are little data available on most on these values in the literature. We base our reference parameters on the available studies.
8 The value of S r is consistent with the magnitude obtained in Zanjani (2002) . 9
The value of π lim corresponds to a return period of 200 years, which is used to calculate the level of required capital in Solvency II.
10 Concerning c r , we calibrated this parameter such that the recourse to external capital following a high loss would be of a magnitude comparable with the one shown on Figure 1 , but without considering new insurers. Finally, available information concerning share repurchase program are from Aon Beneld (2010). Share repurchase are estimated at 2%, peaking at 11% of shareholders fund for three of their reinsurance companies in the rst semester of 2010. This cannot be used directly to calibrate κ, since most of these reinsurers are multiline, but it provides orders of magnitude for this process. To assess the robustness of our results, a sensitivity analysis is conducted on each of these parameters. We consider 5 reinsurers that each have an initial wealth W 0 equal to $20 bn. Our reference market can appear as highly capitalized but as reinsurers are monolines, there is no diversication eects that can play here.
Simulation results
Results are presented on Figure 5 and commented below. All the graphs in this paper will follow the same pattern. The dierent output graphs are disposed following the order presented on 8 Moreover most empirical studies are based on data that do not include years following Katrina. 9 A more detailed analysis by Cummins and Phillips (2005) is focused on the insurance market.
10 See http://www.gccapitalideas.com/2010/02/17/higher-pressure-on-cat-risk-under-solvency-ii-part-istandard-formula-approach/ for a CEIOPS discussion on Solvency II cat risk approach.
The model reproduces a market showing many characteristics similar to those observed empirically. In particular, prices are higher than actuarial prices, market capacity decreases after high loss shocks, as the market price increases, and additional capital is raised by reinsurers after large shocks. Since losses are distributed proportionally to market shares, the reinsurers remain identical during the entire simulation (this assumption is relaxed in Section 6.2). Graph 2: market price of reinsurance as the ratio of price on expected loss. A price equal to 1 corresponds to the expected loss. Market price always exceeds twice the actuarial price.
The price spikes after high loss events. Depending on the size of the shock, the time needed to return to the lower prices is dierent.
Graph 3: reinsurers' probability of default. The probability of default is capped by π Lim as our solvency constraint requires. After loss events, the solvency constraint is saturated until market capacity has replenished itself.
Graph 4: market wealth at the end of the year. The total market capitalization (black curve) is the sum of reinsurer capitalizations (gray curve). Each important loss is followed by capital depletion. After the loss, the market rebuilds itself as capitalization rises. Time needed to recapitalize depends on the intensity of the shock.
Graph 5: reinsurance supply. The gray curve corresponds to the risk covered by one reinsurer, and the black curve to the risk covered by all the market. The total market supply always remains below a ceiling value. This corresponds to an oligopoly eect: serving a higher part of the market would decrease the market price, and not be as beneciary to the reinsurers.
As a consequence, reinsurers voluntarily ration the market to drive prices upward.
Graph 6: market external capital acquisition. The sum of all external capital movements (black curve) corresponds to the sum of the identical individual reinsurers' external capital movements (gray curve). At the beginning of the simulation, it is negative corresponding to a purchase of reinsurer's own shares, as it is the case each time the solvency constraint is not saturated. In such a situation, the market is overcapitalized. Most of the time, external capital is positive and small, but after high losses it becomes much higher (year 15 and 31), as well as in the middle of the series of medium losses (year 41). 
Market dynamics
This reference simulation allows the analysis of the path dependency on the reinsurance market dynamics.
Market behavior with regular losses: From year 1 to 30, losses are globally low and easily absorbed by the market: the global market capacity is high. The risk served by the market does not exceed 80%. The corresponding market price is low, but still twice the actuarial price.
11 The probability of default of the reinsurers is capped at 0.5%, until the reinsurers have replenished themselves during soft markets. In such cases, external capital is slightly negative, corresponding to share repurchase program. Higher losses, as the one that occurred at year 14, lead to a rise in market price. Simultaneously, there is a large increase on the acquisition of external capital that limits the correction on reinsurance supply, as is observed in the market (The Geneva Association Systemic Risk Working Group, 2010).
Impact of a 100-year loss: The impact on the market of the 100-year loss, that happens here on year 30, has three main characteristics. First, market capacity decreases brutally leading to reduced reinsurance capacity. Consequently, the following year sees a double correction from the reinsurers: they lower their supplies, and raise external capital ($12 bn here over two years, that is one fth of amount of reinsured losses of the 100-year event). Their main aim is to limit their probability of default that is capped here at 0.5%. Finally, there is a delay of more than 7 years for the reinsurance industry to recover its initial capacity. At the same time, the market price rises (80% rise). Note that we do not consider any change in reinsurance supply or demand linked to a change in risk evaluation from either insurers and reinsurers.
12 Froot (2001) shows that after a large event, reinsurance coverage increases, but by Bunde et al. (2005) .
This reference simulation already exhibits some of the characteristics of the reinsurance market dynamics. The main ones are (i) the rise of the price following an extreme event, (ii) the correlation between market capacity and the price of risk, and (iii) the fact that reinsurers raise signicant amounts of capital after large shocks. These eects arise from the capacity constraint due to the limit of 0.5% of probability of default. The high rise of the price after year 30 does not take into account the impact of a change in reinsurance demand, nor of a risk reevaluation by reinsurance companies, that Froot (2001) and Guy Carpenter (2009), among others, also mention to explain market reaction.
Sensitivity analysis
Little data are available on the reinsurance market and there is a large uncertainty in all model parameters. In such a situation, it is useful to carry out a sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of our results and to better understand important mechanisms. It is based on the reference reinsurance-market scenario detailed above. We carry out sensitivity analysis on the main parameters presented on Table 1 . For each of those, we take varying values around the one used in the reference scenario. Exact values and gures are presented in Appendix (Figures 11 to 15 ).
Results are the following:
Demand elasticity (e): The higher the demand elasticity, the lower the share of the market covered after the large loss of year 33. This result is consistent with intuition: the increase in prices after a large shock reduces reinsurance demand for insurers. For the year following a high loss, higher elasticity leads to lower ex-post prices. It is in line with the economic theory literature: Cagle and Harrington (1995) show that in the case of capacity constraint and endogenous solvency risk (with limited liability) the increase in price after a shock with inelastic demand price increases is lower than the amount necessary to oset the shock. The higher the elasticity, the lower the impact of shocks on prices. However, when considering market recovery over several years, a lower elasticity leads to an earlier recovery of the market.
Cost of carrying capital (S r ): As can be expected, the higher the cost of holding capital, the less capitalized the reinsurance companies are, and the less they are able to supply the market. Hence, the equilibrium capital level (i.e. the stabilized level if losses are set to the expected loss) depends on the cost of carrying capital. Following a large shock, external capital acquisition is less important when the share cost is high.
Cost of external capital (c r ): This parameters has a main impact after important losses when the reinsurers acquire external capital. The lower the cost of external capital, the more the rms relay on it, and the less the market correction on prices. This leads to a higher capacity of the reinsurance market to supply coverage after important losses when cost of external capital is low. This impact is only visible during tight markets.
Impact of initial capital (W 0 r ): In the present case with a perfectly symmetric market with no entry nor exit, all reinsurers have an optimal capital target that they all tend to reach. A dierence in initial capital disappears after periods of soft market during which the reinsurers can replenish their capital.
Impact of the number of reinsurers (N r ): When we distribute the same total capital among dierent numbers of reinsurers, the oligopoly eect is quite clear: the fewer the reinsurers, the lower market capacity and the higher the prices during soft markets. There is therefore a clear gain from increased competition in the market. However, impact of important losses lead to the same depletion of capacity.
Impacts of the solvency constraint (π lim ): Results show that the lower the solvency constraint, i.e. the higher π lim , the higher the capacity of the reinsurance market in soft market and the higher the time needed for recovery after an important loss. However, as path dependency is important, a rened analysis of the impact of this constraint, particularly on the resistance to high shocks, is conducted in Section 7.
Impacts of the limit share of buy backs (κ): The sensitivity analysis shows that market capitalization stays higher over the scenario when κ is small, as rms can not buy back as many shares as they would for higher level of κ. Consequently, market resilience to large losses is higher.
6 Asymmetric market and reinsurer bankruptcy dierence between large and small reinsurance companies. First, a higher number of reinsurance companies are present on the market. Hence, the strategic impact of each of the rm is lower than in the preceding case, and the oligopoly eect is reduced. Consequently, the total share of the market served by reinsurers is higher, up to 93%.
Small and large companies: Until year 30, our market is naturally segmented into (i) pricemaker big reinsurers, which have a strategic behavior and reduce their market share to drive the price upward; and (ii) followers, which are price-taker and try to capture the largest market share. Interestingly, small reinsurers have a saturated default probability most of the time, contrary to the larger ones. This dierence is due to their lower capitalization and the lower impact of their decisions on the market price. Big reinsurance rms can indeed ration the market by not providing the maximum supply they would be allowed to supply with their capitalization. By reducing the amount of reinsurance they provide, they drive prices upward, increasing their prots. Small reinsurers do not have the same impact on the market price, and they have an interest to capture as much of the market as possible, taking into account their default probability boundary, making small reinsurers more vulnerable than big ones to large disasters.
Convergence of the market With time, the dierence between both capitalization levels decreases, as can be seen on Graph 6. This convergence is natural in such cases of repeated Nash games as small reinsurers capture more and more of market shares until all reinsurers converge to their optimal size for a market of 15 symmetric reinsurers.
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13 Indeed, losses can be interpreted as a capital depletion on average. Simultaneously, we have increasing cost of raising new external capital that can be interpreted as decreasing return to scale. Thus an optimal level of capital for rms is quite classic.
Reinsurers' bankruptcy
To take into account asymmetries among reinsurers, we include the stochastic distribution of losses among insurers, as described in section 3.4. This allows to include reinsurer bankruptcy in the model. The bankruptcy event is set here when reinsurers' wealth fall below a $0.5bn threshold, that corresponds to bankruptcy costs. Figure 6 path dependency is clearly seen on the graph. The impact of the huge loss at year 30 is globally the same on the whole market: the price increases, total market supply is contracted, external capital enters the market. However, when looking at all reinsurers, impacts are very dierent due to the randomization of loss impacts. Three reinsurers go bankrupt. Others, which are less impacted by the loss, benet from the negative impact on the others, and grow more steadily during the years following the shock, beneting from the price rise following the shock and from the increased supply they can provide. This corresponds to the intuition discussed by Cagle and Harrington (1995) although they do not address it in their model. Of course, this is still a very simple representation of the real market, and a deeper study of the impacts of the market structure would be of great interest.
The model allows to get a rst insight on the importance of market structure on the price and capacity dynamics. Interesting results are obtained, as the model reproduces a segmented market with both strategic and follower reinsurers that evolve through time depending on losses impact on them. The former are large enough to have a real impact on prices and to reduce the amount of reinsurance they supply to drive the price upward, especially in hard markets. The latter do not have the same inuence on the market, and behave in some ways as price-taker agents and benets from the price driven by the other ones, as shown on the asymmetric idealized market.
One major insight from this article is the modeling of new capital ows into the market. Two dierent kinds of ows currently exist. First, there is a ow of external capital in surviving reinsurance companies, corresponding to equity emission or development of sidecars and catbonds.
Second, one can observe the development of new reinsurance companies when the reinsurance market price is high (Lane, 2007b) . The total of these two ows is important. Following hurricanes Katrina, Rita and Wilma, for instance, Guy Carpenter (2009) 7 A regulation trade-o: Eciency vs. resilience
Our modeling of reinsurer's risk aversion can be interpreted as a regulatory constraint: reinsurers are not allowed to exceed an exogenous probability of default. This is of course a very simple way to model insurance solvency regulations. Such a constraint has an impact on the market behavior of the rms, as holding more capital to cover the same quantity of risk is costly for the rms. On Figure 8 , we represent the sensitivity analysis conducted on the symmetric market for variations of the threshold default probability π Lim between 0.1% and 0.9%. The impact of this parameter on market variables is important. When the solvency constraint is strong (π Lim low), the share of total loss covered by the reinsurance industry is low, prices are high, and the probability of defaults of reinsurers is saturated even in soft markets. As the limit probability of default is lower, reinsurers need a higher capitalization to cover the supply they provide. we rst studied the impact of a loss on the market price. To do so, we impose a large loss on a stabilized market of 5 symmetric reinsurers, assuming they were exposed to the expected loss level during the 10 previous years (to remove path dependency from the analysis). Figure 9 represents the price in the year following the shock for the limit default probabilities 0.1%, 0.5%, and 1%.
This range is centered on a 200-year risk. Price after large shocks for varying default probability constraints 0.1% 0.25 0.5% 0.75% 1% Figure 9 : Non linearity between price reaction and loss amplitude
We rst observe a non linearity between price and the magnitude of the loss. When the regulation is stricter (lower limit probability of default), the price after small losses is higher, because it requires more capital to supply the same amount of reinsurance capacity. So, the market is most of the time less ecient with a strict regulatory constraint. But after a large loss, the market collapse with a weak constraint (e.g., for losses larger than $80 billion if the limit is at 1%), while the loss can be absorbed with a stricter regulation (however at the expense of a large increase in price). Indeed, the highest loss the market is able to absorb is a market loss of $190 bn for a limit probability of default of 0.1% (1000-year loss), $110 bn for a probability of 0.5% (200-year loss) and $80 bn for a probability of 1% (100-year loss).
A closer look at the impact of the default probability on the market is provided on Figure 10 .
On the typical scenario we used in Section 5, we compute the mean price and mean covered risks on the market during the 50 th years.
14 We see again that average market price increases with the regulatory constraint whereas correspondingly the capacity of the reinsurance market decreases.
Thus tighter regulation leads during a regular time period with limited losses to higher prices and less available capacity for the same amount of capital. This is a typical example of an eciency vs. resilience trade-o as can be found in ecological systems. 14 A proper analysis would require running the full model with loss randomization. This will be done in a further version of the model.
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In the case of reinsurance companies, it could be argued that insurance companies could have the ability to monitor them eciently.
Conclusion
The model outputs shed a better light on the way classical economic assumptions allow for understanding and reproducing the reinsurance market dynamics. Compared with previous analyses, our approach investigates the issues of reinsurance capacity to withstand important losses in a dynamic framework. Our model relies on a capacity constraint analysis, with a threshold probability of default for reinsurance rms. This factor may enhance the role of regulatory measures on the dynamics and the resilience of the reinsurance market either through the resistance to severe losses or through the time needed for capacity replenishment. Furthermore, we take into account the impacts of the rm choice on the market equilibrium to model potential strategic behaviors of large reinsurers. Our approach is innovative as we compute a dynamics of the market, based on these clear and tractable assumptions.
This analysis is only the rst step of a broader research agenda. Incorporating several lines of risk will rene the reinsurance demand model. A better calibration would allow a better understanding of the market features that inuence the market resilience. Recent data on reinsurance contracts would be needed to do so, and they are dicult to access. The long-term objectives of this model are to develop insights on the needed market capacity and to understand the insurance industry limits in providing disaster coverage. This question is critical when considering the current trends in insured and reinsured exposure. In addition to the classical economic trend issues (Hallegatte, 2011) , the IPCC (2007) suggests a probable rise in the frequency and intensity of some natural disasters (e.g., storm surge and coastal oods). Several studies have proposed projections of future exposure due to these trends (see for instance Hanson et al. (2011) on the exposure in coastal cities) and the consideration of dierent scenarios will be necessary. How could the reinsurance industry be able to cover increasing risks, and how could specic policies and regulations enhance its ability to do so?
(1 + α)
In the case where the constraint is not saturated, the choices of external capital and reinsurance supply are not linked any more. The rst order conditions for the concerned reinsurers are composed of two dierent elements: (F OCO) determining the reinsurance supply choice and (F OCE) determining the external capital level that corresponds to the exogenous limit for reducing the amount of capital through share purchase programs and special dividend.
A.2 Sensitivity analysis Sensitivity analyses are conducted on key parameters. Parameters are changed individually from the reference reinsurance-market scenario. The order of the graphs is the same as for the reference simulations.
To be able to better read the results, a shorter time period is shown for each analysis, depending on the parameter considered. Figure 11 presents the sensitivity analysis for the elasticity of demand. The elasticity parameter e = EL * δ (0.2 corresponds to a low elasticity, and 0.6 to a high demand elasticity with respect to price. Note that for a low elasticity, pale gray, reinsurers buy share back much more frequently since price and quantity can be large together. The Figure corresponding to the sensitivity analysis for π lim can be found in Section 7 (Figure 8 ) .
